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xABSTRACT
A known-plaintext attack on the Advanced Encryption Standard can be formulated as a
system of quadratic multivariate polynomial equations in which the unknowns represent key
bits. Algorithms such as XSL and XL use properties of the cipher to build a sparse system of
linear equations over the field GF(2) from those multivariate polynomial equations. A scaled
down version of AES called Baby Rijndael has structure similar to AES and can be attacked
using the XL and XSL techniques among others. This results in a large sparse system of linear
equations over the field GF(2) with an unknown number of extraneous solutions that need to be
weeded out. High Performance Computing techniques were used to create SPSOLVERMOD2
a parallel software designed to solve sparse systems of linear equations over the field GF(2).
In this thesis we apply XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael. Using SPSOLVERMOD2
we have shown XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael do not give the desired result when
one block of message and corresponding cipher text are provided. The number of linearly
dependent equations we get close to 100000 and the number of possible solutions is huge.
Finally we present the design of SPSOLVERMOD2 as well as the challenges we met on our way.
Also the performance results for random matrices on different clusters and supercomputers are
discussed.
1CHAPTER 1. A General Overview and Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The security of many recent cryptosystems relies on the computational complexity of solving
large systems of quadratic multivariate polynomial equations, the MQ problem. The same
problem arises naturally in other subareas of Mathematics and Computer Science, such as
optimization, combinatorics, coding theory, and computer algebra (3). For instance, several
recent papers discuss the connection between the NP-hard MQ problem and the polynomial
time problem of solving a sparse system of linear equations over a finite field.
In particular, a known-plaintext attack on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) can
be formulated in term of an MQ problem, where the unknowns represent key bits. Algorithms
such as XSL and XL were introduced to solve this particular MQ problem (3), (4). These
algorithms use properties of the cipher to build a sparse system of linear equations over the
field GF(2) from multivariate polynomial equations. The exact complexity of these algorithms
is unknown. It has also not been determined whether those algorithms are efficient as an attack
on AES.
In Chapter 3 a scaled-down version of AES called Baby Rijndael is described. It has
a structure similar to AES, and can be attacked using the XL and XSL techniques among
others. The XL and XSL attack produce a large sparse system of linear equations over the
field GF(2) with an unknown number of extraneous solutions that need to be weeded out.
Special software was created to meet this challenge.
This software is implemented using the MPI C language since High Performance computing
recourses are required. Gaussian Elimination, which is believed to be reasonably efficient for
matrices over GF(2) (18), is the basic technique used by the software. Although there are
2different methods to represent large sparse matrices in the computer memory, most of them are
inefficient when Gaussian Elimination is used, since the original matrix is constantly evolving
and can expand rapidly.
The main challenge of the Gaussian Elimination step is in managing the rapidly increasing
size of the matrix — the fill-in problem. Frequently, it is only the equations “owned” by a few
of the processors that have grown excessively while other processors still have plenty of free
space. To deal with this phenomena a load balance function was developed: it pairs the most
loaded processors with ones which have the lightest load, and then exchanges some equations
between the pair. Load balancing is time consuming and used only when the processor is close
to running out of memory.
Random sparse matrices over field GF(2) have been used to test the program. The perfor-
mance results with the running time as a function of the size of the system and the number of
processors on the different high-performance computers can be found in Chapter 9.
In this dissertation we present results of an XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael. The
attack was unsuccessful when one block of plaintext and ciphertext were used. We also describe
design and performance of a parallel software called SPSOLVERMOD2. Our research shows
that properties of random matrices result in undesirable behavior of SPSOLVERMOD2 and
make useless many of supporting functions.
1.2 Thesis Organization
This thesis is divided into three separate parts:
Part 1 is based on my Masters Thesis (17) and presents the Cryptography context of the
work. It describes the AES and Baby Rijndael ciphers as well as the XL and XSL methods.
Chapter 5 presents an application of the XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael. It also
discusses how our cryptography problem can be reduced to a linear algebra problem of solving
a large sparse system of equations over the field GF (2).
Part 2 is devoted to the linear algebra aspects of solving the problem above in an efficient
way. Chapter 6 describes various methods for solving systems of linear equations. It focuses on
3direct methods, in particular on Gauss Elimination process which is used by the solver which
we created. Different reordering techniques that make Gauss Elimination more effective are
also investigated.
Finally, Part 3 addresses the High Performance Computing aspects of this work. It describes
a solver that was developed in order to find all possible solution of the sparse linear systems
over the field GF (2). Performance results of this software on different platforms is presented
in Chapter 9. The same results are presented in (16) and parts of that paper are reproduced
almost verbatim in in this thesis.
4PART I
Cryptography: The XL and XSL attack on Baby Rijndael
5CHAPTER 2. Rijndael - AES - Advanced Encryption Standard
This chapter is based on my Master Thesis (17).
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Cryptography Definitions
There are some very basic concepts in cryptography that we should define in order to
understand AES and Baby Rijndael structure.
Definition 2.1.1. A cryptosystem is a five-tuple (P,C,K,E,D), where:
1. P is a finite set of possible inputs/plaintexts,
2. C is a finite set of possible outputs/ciphertexts,
3. K is a finite set of possible keys, and
4. for each k ∈ K there is an encryption function ek ∈ E, and a corresponding decryption
function dk ∈ D. Each ek : P → C and dk : C → P has the property dk(ek(x)) = x for
every plaintext element x ∈ P .
The function ek is called a cipher. There are many different kinds of ciphers. All of them
take a message as an input and return some output. The message can be represented in many
ways; it may be just an array of letters or words, or it might be text represented as numbers,
or even binary numbers. The output can also constitute an array of letters or numbers.
We will call the input a plaintext block and the output a ciphertext block. The operation
of transforming a plaintext block into a ciphertext block is called encryption. The operation of
6transforming a ciphertext block into a plaintext block is called decryption. Most of the ciphers
use not only some input, but also a key, since it makes the cipher more secure.
To illustrate the concept, assume that Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob. She
wants to be sure that nobody except Bob can read the message. This is easy to do if they have
some cipher that no one else knows or if they share some secret key. However, in many cases,
Bob will never see or speak to Alice, so they won’t be able to agree upon such a cipher or a
key.
There are two different kinds of ciphers using keys: public-key ciphers and private-key
ciphers. The major difference between these two is that in a private-key cipher, only Alice and
Bob know the secret key. In a public-key cipher, the key is not secret but rather is common
knowledge. We can define these concepts more precisely as follows.
Definition 2.1.2. A public-key cryptosystem is a cryptosystem in which each participant
has a public key and a private key. It should be infeasible to determine the private key from
knowledge of the public key. To send a message to Alice, Bob will use her public key. Nobody
except Alice knows her private key, and one must know the private key to decrypt the message.
The most commonly used public key cryptosystem is the RSA cryptosystem. More detail
can be found in (25). However, in this paper we will be dealing with AES, also called Rijndael,
which is a private-key cryptosystem. Alice and Bob can send the private key for AES using
RSA cryptosystem. RSA is much slower than AES this is why it is better to send long messages
using AES.
Definition 2.1.3. A symmetric-key cryptosystem (or a private-key cryptosystem) is a
cryptosystem in which the participants share a secret key. To encrypt a message, Bob will
use this key. To decrypt the message Alice will either use the same key or will derive the
decryption key from the secret key. In a symmetric-key cryptosystem, exposure of the private
key makes the system insecure.
Definition 2.1.4. A block cipher is a function which maps n-bit plaintext blocks to n-bit
ciphertext blocks. The function is parameterized by a key. n is called the block size.
7Definition 2.1.5. An iterated block cipher is one that encrypts a plaintext block by a
process that has several rounds. In each round, the same transformation or round function is
applied to the intermediate result, called the state, using a round key. The set of round keys is
usually derived from the user-provided secret key by a key schedule. The number of rounds in
an iterated cipher depends on the desired security level. In most cases, an increased number
of rounds will improve the security offered by a block cipher.
Figure 2.1 Iterative block cipher with three rounds. (5) pg. 25.
Definition 2.1.6. A key-alternating block cipher is an iterative block cipher with the
following properties:
1. Alternation: The cipher is defined as the alternated application of key-independent round
transformations and key additions. The first round key is added before the first round
and the last round key is added after the last round.
2. Simple key addition: The round keys are added to the state by means of a simple addition
modulo two, called XOR (⊕).
We already mentioned that a block cipher is a function. This is true for any cipher. First,
we want to encrypt plaintext, and then we want to decrypt ciphertext to get our plaintext
back. So an important condition for our function is that it be one-to-one.
Definition 2.1.7. A function is one-to-one if no two different elements in its domain are
mapped to the same element in image.
8Figure 2.2 Key-alternating block cipher with two rounds. (5) pg. 26.
The purpose of a cipher is to make communication secure. It is not enough to ensure that
one cannot crack the cipher you build. The ultimate goal is to ensure that no one else can
crack it either. There are many known attacks and one should ensure that the cipher cannot
be cracked by any of them, at least not easily.
There is one attack that can be applied to any symmetric-key cipher.
Definition 2.1.8. A brute-force attack is a known-plaintext attack. It tries every possible
key until one of them “works”. That is, knowing the input and output, the attack will try
all possible keys until it finds a key K so that the encryption of the input with K gives the
desired output.
It is easy to see why this attack will always work. The problem is that the running time
of such an attack is typically very large. It can sometimes take centuries! AES can be cracked
by Brute-Force in an ideal world, but in real life, based on current technology, it can not.
It should be mentioned that there might be more than one key. That is, if one knows
both the plaintext and the ciphertext, there might be more than one key that will encrypt
plaintext to this ciphertext. Actually, the false-positive probability for a key is approximately
1 − e−2m−n , if we know one block of size n, and the key size is m. If we know 2 blocks, then
the false-positive probability becomes smaller, namely 1− e−2m−2n .
92.1.2 Algebra Definitions
In Section 2.4 we will introduce the way each byte of the input to Rijndael is represented
as an element of the field GF (28). In order to describe this, we need some basic definitions
about fields.
Definition 2.1.9. A group is an ordered pair (G, ?), where G is a set and ? is a binary
operation on G satisfying the following axioms:
1. ((a ? b) ? c) = (a ? (b ? c)), for all a, b, c ∈ G.
2. There exists an identity element e such that for all a ∈ G, a ? e = e ? a = a.
3. For each a ∈ G, there is an inverse element a−1 such that a ? a−1 = a−1 ? a = e.
Definition 2.1.10. A group is an Abelian group if for every a, b ∈ G, a ? b = b ? a.
Definition 2.1.11. A field is a set F together with the binary operations addition (+) and
multiplication (·) on F such that:
1. (F ,+) is an abelian group with identity 0.
2. (F − {0}, ·) is an abelian group.
3. For all a, b, c ∈ F , a · (b+ c) = (a · b) + (a · c).
GF (28) is a field whose elements are polynomials of degree less than 8, with coefficients 0
or 1. In other words, each element of GF (28) can be written as:
a7x
7 + a6x6 + a5x5 + a4x4 + a3x3 + a2x2 + a1x+ a0
where ai ∈ {0, 1}, for i = 0, . . . , 7.
As we can see from the definition of the field, there are two operations defined on GF (28):
addition and multiplication. Addition is performed by adding the coefficients for corresponding
powers of the polynomials modulo 2. For example,
(x7 + x5 + x4 + x2 + x) + (x6 + x5 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1) = x7 + x6 + x4 + x3 + 1
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Multiplication in GF (28) is performed by multiplying two polynomials and then reducing this
product modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree 8. For example, consider the irreducible
polynomial m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1. Then
(x6 + x4 + x2 + x+ 1) · (x7 + x+ 1) = x13 + x11 + x9 + x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + 1.
Now, take the result mod m(x):
x13 + x11 + x9 + x8 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x3 + 1 (modulo x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1) = x7 + x6 + 1.
Definition 2.1.12. A polynomial is said to be irreducible if it cannot be factored into
nontrivial polynomials over the same field. For example, over the finite field GF (23), the
polynomial x2 + x+ 1 is irreducible. However, the polynomial x2 + 1 is not, because it can be
written as (x+ 1)(x+ 1) = x2 + 2x+ 1 = x2 + 1.
There is an inverse element for every element of the field except for the 0 polynomial. The
existence of unique inverse element comes from the fact that the multiplication is performed
modulo an irreducible polynomial. For convenience, we declare that the inverse element of 0
is 0 itself. We will use these facts in the next chapter.
2.2 AES
On January 2, 1997, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began
looking for a replacement for DES — the Data Encryption Standard. DES was used as an
encryption standard for almost 25 years. The decision was made to replace the standard
because the key length of DES was relatively small and some new attacks using faster new
computers could crack DES. Even a Brute-Force search is possible in this case since for DES
only 255 key options exist. It was not secure anymore. The new cryptosystem would be
called AES — the Advanced Encryption Standard. It should have a block length of 128 bits
and support key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits. Fifteen of the submitted systems met these
criteria and were accepted by NIST as candidates for AES. All of the candidates were evaluated
taking into account three main criteria: security, cost (such as computational efficiency), and
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algorithm and implementation characteristics (such as flexibility and algorithm simplicity).
There were five finalists, all of which appeared to be secure. On October 2, 2000, Rijndael
was selected to be the Advanced Encryption Standard, because its security, performance,
efficiency, implementability and flexibility were judged to be superior to the other finalists.
Finally, Rijndael was adopted as a standard on November 26, 2001, and posted in the Federal
Register on December 4, 2001.
There is only one difference between Rijndael and AES. Rijndael can support block and
key lengths between 128 and 256 bits which are multiples of 32. AES only has a specific block
length of 128 bits.
2.3 Rijndael Structure
Rijndael is a key iterated and key-alternating block cipher. In this section, we will describe
Rijndael with a block size and key size of 128 bits and with 10 rounds.
The cipher has the form
E(A) = r10 ◦ r9 ◦ · · · ◦ r2 ◦ r1(A⊕K0).
Every round except the last one has the form
ri(A) = (t ◦ σ̂ ◦ S∗(A))⊕Ki,
where A is the state and Ki is the ith round key. The last round will not have the t operation.
We think about A and K as 4×4 arrays of bytes (one byte is equal to 8 bits).
A =

a00 a01 a02 a03
a10 a11 a12 a13
a20 a21 a22 a23
a30 a31 a32 a33
 K =

k00 k01 k02 k03
k10 k11 k12 k13
k20 k21 k22 k23
k30 k31 k32 k33

Figure 2.3 The matrices A and K.
Every round starts by applying S∗ to the state A. More precisely, S∗ applies a function s
to each byte of A. Function s is a nonlinear, invertible function which takes 8 bits and returns
12
8 bits. This function is called an S-box and in the Rijndael specification, it is called SubBytes
(see Figure 2.6). We will see how this s function works in Section 2.4. For now, we can think
about this s function as a table-lookup. We should mention that in some ciphers there is more
than one S-box, and different S-boxes are applied on different inputs. In AES the same S-box
is applied on all rounds and all inputs.
After computing S∗(A), we apply σ̂ to the result, where σ̂ is a permutation function called
ShiftRow (see Figure 2.7) and is given by
σ̂(aij) = ai,j−i(mod4).
The next function to be applied is t. This function is called MixColumn (see Figure 2.8).
t(A) = M ·A where M is a 4×4 matrix from GF(28), see Figure 2.4. t is a linear function and
t(A) is a 4×4 matrix, the new state. At the end of each round, we will XOR bitwise the state
and the round key. This function is called AddRoundKey (see Figure 2.9).
M =

02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02

Figure 2.4 The M matrix.
The only part we still need to explain is how to get the round keys. First, we will construct
a list w0, w1, . . . , w43, each of which is a 4-byte vector, according to the rule:
wi =

(k4i, k4i+1, k4i+2, k4i+3) for i=0,1,2,3,
wi−4 ⊕ wi−1 for i mod 4 6= 0,
wi−4 ⊕ S∗(α̂(wi−1))⊕ ci for i mod 4 = 0.
The function α̂ is defined by α̂(x, y, z, u) = (y, z, u, x), the ci’s are constant vectors and
k0, . . . , k15 are the bytes of the cipher key. To get Ki for round i, we will just build a matrix
with columns w4i, w4i+1, w4i+2, w4i+3.
In section 4, we will see a more detailed explanation of an S-box. There are more details
about Rijndael structure in (5).
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Rijndael has a very interesting property that the structure of the decryption algorithm
is similar to that of the encryption algorithm. Both have the same steps, but with inverse
functions. In our research we will not use the decryption algorithm at all, so we will not
describe it here. A description of the decryption algorithm can be found in (5).
2.4 Rijndael and GF (28)
In this section, we describe how to represent a byte as an element of the finite field GF (28).
Let b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1, b0 represent bits of a byte. Then the corresponding element of GF (28)
will be b7x7 + b6x6 + b5x5 + b4x4 + b3x3 + b2x2 + b1x+ b0. The addition will just be the addi-
tion defined for GF (28) and multiplication will be defined modulo the irreducible polynomial
m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1.
In Section 2.3, we said that an S-box is a table-lookup. However, we can actually represent
an S-box as a function s acting on elements from GF (28). Assume the input to the S-box is
some element a ∈GF (28). We can find the inverse element of a (call it a−1). This inverse
element corresponds to multiplication modulo m(x) in GF (28). If the S-box function was just
defined as an “inverse” function, then it could be attacked using algebraic manipulations. This
is why the S-box also uses multiplication and addition. This makes part of the S-box an affine
transformation. We denote this affine transformation by f and say that c = f(d), where f is
described in Figure 2.5.
c7
c6
c5
c4
c3
c2
c1
c0

=

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

×

d7
d6
d5
d4
d3
d2
d1
d0

⊕

0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1

Figure 2.5 The affine transformation.
We apply f on a−1, so actually d = a−1.
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Another way of thinking about an affine function f is as a polynomial multiplication by a
fixed polynomial followed by the addition of a constant.
Thus the S-box first finds the inverse element of a and then puts it in the affine transforma-
tion. Why did they build the S-box for Rijndael in this way? The affine function was chosen
in such a way so that for all S-boxes, there are no fixed points and no opposite fixed points.
That is, s(a)⊕a 6= 00 and s(a)⊕a 6= FF. Where 00 is the zero polynomial of degree 7, and FF
is the polynomial of degree 7 with all coefficients equal to 1. In (22), K. Nyberg gives several
construction methods for S-boxes. The S-boxes for Rijndael are constructed using one of these
methods.
The round function of Rijndael has two main parts: the linear part and the non-linear
part. The only non-linear part is SubBytes. We will use the properties to build a system of
non-linear equations in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
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Figure 2.6 SubBytes acts on the individual bytes of the state. (1) pg. 16.
Figure 2.7 ShiftRows operates on the rows of the state. (1) pg. 17.
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Figure 2.8 MixColumns operates on the columns of the state. (1) pg. 18.
Figure 2.9 AddRoundKey XOR each column of the state with word from the key schedule.
(l is a round number). (1) pg. 19.
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CHAPTER 3. Baby Rijndael
3.1 Baby Rijndael structure
This chapter is taken almost verbatim from my Master Thesis (17).
3.1.1 Introduction
For the purpose of our research we constructed a new cipher called Baby Rijndael. It is a
scaled-down version of the AES cipher. Since Rijndael has an algebraic structure, it is easy
to describe this smaller cipher with a similar structure. There were many choices made when
Rijndael was constructed, so there is more than one way to build Baby Rijndael.
Baby Rijndael was constructed by Professor Clifford Bergman. He used this cipher as a
homework exercise for a cryptography graduate course at Iowa State University. He wanted
a cipher that would help his students to learn how to implement Rijndael, but on a smaller,
more manageable level.
The block size and key size of baby Rijndael will be 16 bits. We will think of them as 4
hexadicimal digits (called hex digits for short), h0h1h2h3 for blocks and k0k1k2k3 for cipher
keys. Note that h0 consists of the first four bits of the input stream. However, when h0 is
considered as a hex digit, the first bit is considered the high-order bit. The same is true for
the cipher key.
For example, the input block 1000 1100 0111 0001 would be represented with h0 =8, h1 = c,
h2 = 7, h3 = 1.
Baby Rijndael consists of several rounds, all of which are identical in structure. The default
number of rounds is four, but this number can be changed. Changing the number of rounds
affects the overall description of the cipher and also the key schedule in a small way. In our
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attack, we will use both one-round Baby Rijndael and four-round Baby Rijndael.
The steps of the cipher are applied to the state. The state is usually considered to be a
2× 2 array of hex digits. However, for the t operation, the state is considered to be an 8× 2
array of bits. In converting between the two, each hex digit is considered to be a column of 4
bits with the high-order bit at the top.
The input block is loaded into the state by mapping h0h1h2h3 to
(
h0 h2
h1 h3
)
. For example,
the input block 1000 1100 0111 0001 would be loaded as
8 7
c 1
which, as an 8× 2 bit matrix is

1 0
0 1
0 1
0 1
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 1

The state is usually denoted by a.
3.1.2 The cipher
At the beginning of the cipher, the input block is loaded into the state as described above
and the round keys are computed. The cipher has the following overall structure:
E(a) = r4 ◦ r3 ◦ r2 ◦ r1(a⊕ k0).
In this expression, a denotes the state, k0,k1,k2,k3,k4 the round keys and
ri(a) =
(
t · σˆ(S(a)))⊕ ki,
except that in r4, multiplication by t is omitted. At the end of the cipher, the state is unloaded
into a 16-bit block in the same order in which it was loaded.
Here is a description of the individual functions of the cipher.
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SubBytes: The S operation is a table lookup applied to each hex digit of the state, as
shown in Figure 3.1. (
h0 h2
h1 h3
)
S−−→
(
s(h0) s(h2)
s(h1) s(h3)
)
Figure 3.1 SubBytes operation.
where the s function is given by Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 S-box table lookup.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
s(x) a 4 3 b 8 e 2 c 5 7 6 f 0 1 9 d
In the next section we will describe how to get this table.
ShiftRows: The σˆ operation simply swaps the entries in the second row of the state,
Figure 3.2. (
h0 h2
h1 h3
)
σˆ−−→
(
h0 h2
h3 h1
)
Figure 3.2 ShiftRows operation.
MixColumns: The matrix t is the 8× 8 matrix of bits shown in Figure 3.3.
For this transformation, the state is considered to be an 8× 2 matrix of bits. The state is
multiplied by t on the left using matrix multiplication modulo 2: a 7→ t · a.
KeySchedule: At the beginning of the cipher and at the end of each round, the state is
bitwise added (mod 2) to the round key. The round keys are 2× 2 arrays of hex digits similar
to the state. The columns of the round keys are defined recursively as follows:
w0 =
(
k0
k1
)
w1 =
(
k2
k3
)
w2i = w2i−2 ⊕ S(reverse(w2i−1))⊕ yi w2i+1 = w2i−1 ⊕ w2i
for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The constants are yi =
(
2i−1
0
)
and the reverse function interchanges the two
entries in the column. Notice that yi is a vector of length 8 bits and 2i−1 and 0 are each four
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t =

1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1

Figure 3.3 MixColumn operation.
bits. The S function is the same as the one used above. Note that all additions are bitwise
mod 2. Finally, for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, the round key ki is the matrix whose columns are w2i and
w2i+1.
Baby Rijndael has a structure similar to Rijndael. If we look at a round of Baby Rijndael,
it has the same functions as Rijndael. All the functions constructed for Baby Rijndael were
built in the same way as the Rijndael functions, but they will work on a smaller state. For
example, ShiftRows for Baby Rijndael works in the same way as ShiftRows of Rijndael works
on the 2×2 upper left submatrix of Rijndael. The KeySchedule uses the same definition as in
Rijndael, but only for 2 smaller w’s. In Section 3.2, we will see why the S-box construction of
both ciphers is similar.
3.2 Baby Rijndael S-box Structure
We described in Section 2.4 how to represent a byte as an element of finite field GF (28).
Now we will show how to represent a hex digit as an element of field GF (24). Let b =
b3, b2, b1, b0. Then the corresponding element of GF (24) will be b3x3 + b2x2 + b1x + b0 (see
Table 3.2). The addition for GF (24) will be defined in usual way and multiplication will be
defined modulo the irreducible polynomial m(x) = x4 + x+ 1.
We will not change the structure of the S-box. It will stay same as for Rijndael, but we
can not use the same affine transformation f we had before. Now we have a smaller sate. Let
us define a new f for Baby Rijndael in Figure 3.4.
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Table 3.2 Different representations for GF (24) elements.
hex binary polynomial
0 0000 0
1 0001 1
2 0010 x
3 0011 x+ 1
4 0100 x2
5 0101 x2 + 1
6 0110 x2 + x
7 0111 x2 + x+ 1
8 1000 x3
9 1001 x3 + 1
a 1010 x3 + x
b 1011 x3 + x+ 1
c 1100 x3 + x2
d 1101 x3 + x2 + 1
e 1110 x3 + x2 + x
f 1111 x3 + x2 + x+ 1

c3
c2
c1
c0
 =

0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
×

d3
d2
d1
d0
⊕

0
1
0
1

Figure 3.4 The affine transformation for Baby Rijndael.
As in Rijndael, we apply f on a−1, so actually d = a−1.
Another way of thinking about an affine function f is as polynomial multiplication followed
by XOR with a constant. So it can be represented as s(x) = b(x)g(x)+c(x). g(x) is the inverse
element of the input to the S-box, b(x) = x3 + x2 + x and c(x) = x3 + x. The result will be
taken modulo x4 + 1.
So the S-box first finds the inverse element of a and then puts it in the affine transformation.
Table 3.3 shows all the inverse elements.
As one can see, our Baby Rijndael S-box has similar properties to the Rijndael S-box. It
uses the inverse element and affine transformation and there are no fixed points or opposite
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Table 3.3 The inverse elements.
x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
x−1 0 1 9 e d b 7 6 f 2 c 5 a 4 3 8
fixed points. This is why we can use Rijndael attacks which uses S-box properties on Baby
Rijndael.
3.3 Example
3.3.1 Example for Key Schedule
Sample key expansion for key=6b5d
w0 =
6
b
 w1 =
5
d

w1
reverse−−−−→
d
5
 S−→
1
e
⊕ w0 =
7
5
⊕ y1 =
6
5
 = w2 w1 ⊕ w2 =
3
8
 = w3
w3
reverse−−−−→
8
3
 S−→
5
b
⊕ w2 =
3
e
⊕ y2 =
1
e
 = w4 w3 ⊕ w4 =
2
6
 = w5
w5
reverse−−−−→
6
2
 S−→
2
3
⊕ w4 =
3
d
⊕ y3 =
7
d
 = w6 w5 ⊕ w6 =
5
b
 = w7
w7
reverse−−−−→
b
5
 S−→
f
e
⊕ w6 =
8
3
⊕ y4 =
0
3
 = w8 w7 ⊕ w8 =
5
8
 = w9
Where y1 =
1
0
 y2 =
2
0
 y3 =
4
0
 y4 =
8
0

23
3.3.2 Example for Encryption
Sample encryption for key=6b5d and plaintext block=2ca5.
round start apply S apply σˆ mult by t ⊕ round key=
input
2 a
c 5
 ⊕
6 5
b d
 =
1
4 f
7 8

8 d
c 5

8 d
5 c

2 f
0 7
 ⊕
6 3
5 8
 =
2
4 c
5 f

8 0
e d

8 0
d e

0 a
e 3
 ⊕
1 2
e 6
 =
3
1 8
0 5

4 5
a e

4 5
e a

d 9
2 8
 ⊕
7 5
d b
 =
4
a c
f 3

6 0
d b

6 0
b d
 ⊕
0 5
3 8
 =
output
6 5
8 5

Thus the encryption of 2ca5 under key 6b5d is 6855.
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CHAPTER 4. The XL and XSL attacks
4.1 MQ problem
The problem of a solving linear system of equations with n equations and n unknowns is
easy. Gaussian elimination is a well-known algorithm for solving such a system and it has a
running time of O(n3). Actually, depending on the system of equations, there are even quicker
techniques.
The MQ problem is the problem of solving a system of multivariate quadratic equations.
This means that the equations we will have in our system can have quadratic terms. We will
consider a system with m equations and n unknowns with m > n, over the field GF (2).
Each equation for the MQ problem can be represented as:
∑
i,j
ai,j,kxixj +
∑
i
bi,kxi + ck = 0
where xi’s are unknown, ai,j,k, bi,k, ck ∈ GF (2) are constant and k indexes the equations we
are looking at.
As we already mentioned, a linear system of equations has a polynomial time algorithm,
but the MQ problem is NP-hard, see (6). Until now, it was believed that exponential time is
needed to solve this problem.
However, for an overdefined systems of multivariate quadratic equations, (that is, m > n),
some algorithms that appear to run in polynomial time have been proposed. For example,
Kipnis and Shamir in (15) presented a new algorithm called relinearization. After their publi-
cation, many improved algorithms for relinearization were suggested.
The idea of all these algorithms is simple. We do not know in general how to solve the
MQ problem, but we do know how to solve a linear system of equations. So we will transform
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multivariate quadratic equations to linear equations.
The problem is that it is not yet clear how these algorithms will work in real life and what
running time they will have. It has only been checked on small examples, and there might be
cases when those algorithms will not work.
4.2 Relinearization technique
As described above, the idea of linearization is not hard. We simply replace every quadratic
term in our system of multivariate quadratic equations by a new variable. That is, assume we
have n variables: x1, . . . , xn. We will replace every quadratic term xi ∗ xj by a new variable
yij . Now we have a system of linear equations, which we know how to solve. However, in order
to solve a system of linear equations, we need to have at least as many equations as unknowns.
Therefore, there is a big restriction on using this method, assuming that every quadratic term
is present, the number of equations we have must be at least n
2
2 , where n is the number of
original variables.
Example 4.2.1: A system of four equations with three unknowns after linearization will
become a system of four equations with six unknowns.
x1 + x1x2 + x2 = 0 x1 + y12 + x2 = 0
x1x2 + x3 = 1 y12 + x3 = 1
x2 + x1x3 = 0 x2 + y13 = 0
x1 + x2x3 + x3 = 1 x1 + y23 + x3 = 1
The relinearization technique was introduced by Aviad Kipnis and Adi Shamir in (15).
This method works well for the MQ problem, if the number of equations is at least n2, where
n is the number of variables and 0 ≤  ≤ 12 . Assume that we have a system of multivariate
quadratic equations which meets this requirement. To solve such a system, they suggest first
making replacements as in the linearization tecnique. That is, replace every quadratic term
xi ∗xj , i ≤ j, by a new variable yij . Then construct more equations using connections between
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the new variables. For example, if 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d ≤ n, then (xa ∗ xb) ∗ (xc ∗ xd) =
(xa ∗ xc) ∗ (xb ∗ xd) = (xa ∗ xd) ∗ (xb ∗ xc)⇒ yab ∗ ycd = yac ∗ ybd = yad ∗ ybc.
Now we have more equations, but all the new equations we get have quadratic terms in
them. So we will use linearization again to get a system of linear equations. There is a
discussion in (15) that argues that this iterative technique will eventually succeed in producing
a linear system with sufficiently many equations.
4.3 The XL method for solving MQ problem
XL (which stands for eXtended Linearization) was created by Nicolas Courtois, Alexander
Klimov, Jacques Patarin and Adi Shamir in Eurocrypt’2000 (3). The problem they want to
solve is described in (3) in the following way:
Let K be a field, and let A be a system of multivariate quadratic equations, li = 0,
(1 ≤ i ≤ m) where each li is the multivariate polynomial fi(x1, . . . , xn)− bi. The problem
is to find at least one solution x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Kn, for a given b = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Km.
In the XL algorithm, we will need to create equations of the form (
∏k
j=1 xij )∗ li = 0, where
xij ∈ (x1, . . . , xn). Equations of this type are denoted by xkl, and xkl also denotes the set of
all such equations. The set of all terms of degree k is denoted by xk (so xk = {∏kj=1 xij : xij ∈
(x1, . . . , xn)}). For D ∈ N, ID will be the linear space generated by all the equations of the
form xkl for 0 ≤ k ≤ D − 2.
This is how they defined their algorithm.
Definition 4.3.1. The XL algorithm executes the following steps:
1. Multiply: Generate all the products (
∏k
ij
xij ) ∗ li ∈ ID with k ≤ D − 2.
2. Linearize: Consider each monomial in xk of degree at most D as a new variable and
perform Gaussian elimination on the equations obtained in 1.
The ordering on the monomials must be such that all the terms containing one variable
(say x1) are eliminated last.
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3. Solve: Assume that step 2 yields at least one univariate equation in the powers of xi for
some i. Solve this equation over the finite field K.
4. Repeat: Simplify the equations and repeat the process to find the values of the other
variables.
In other words, we will have a system of multivariate quadratic equations over the field K
represented as a system of equations where each equation looks like
∑
i,j
ai,j,kxixj +
∑
i
bkxi + ck = 0,
where the xi’s are unknown, and k is the number of the equation.
To solve this system, we will first agree on some integer D > 2. A complexity evaluation
of XL in (3) gives the following estimation:
D ≥ n√
m
,
where m is the number of equations in the original system and n is the number of variables in
the original system.
After we pick D, we will take the list of original variables and construct a new list of
variables with every possible power less or equal to D− 2. For example, if the list of variables
is (x, y, z) and D = 4, then the new list will be (x, y, z, x2, y2, z2, xy, xz, yz). Then we will
multiply each original equation by each variable from the new list. This operation will give us
more linearly independent equations. It is not necessarily true that all the new equations will
be linearly independent, but it is hoped that most of them will be.
Now, let’s combine the old and new systems of equations together. We will replace every
monomial that appear in any equation by a new variable. For example, the equation x4 +
x3y + x2yz + x2z2 + x2y = 0 will be a + b + c + d + f = 0, where a = x4, b = x3y, etc. Then
we will have a linear system of equations, with the number of equations being larger than the
number of variables. This is why we should pick D carefully, so that after multiplication this
condition on the number of variables and equations will hold.
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Using Gaussian elimination we can find a solution, if one exists. We still have our original
variables for the original equations, so we will obtain values for them. It might be that we
have more than one solution to the expanded system. For more examples, see (3).
Example 4.2.2: From a system of four equations with three unknowns from Example 4.2.1
we will get a new system of 16 equations with 12 new equations and four original equations.
Since we are working over the GF (2) for every x, x2 = x.
x1 + x1x2 + x2 = 0 x2 = 0
x1x2 + x3 = 1 x2 + x1x2 + x2x3 = 0
x1x3 + x2 = 0 x1x2x3 + x2 = 0
x1 + x2x3 + x3 = 1 x1x2 + x2 = 0
x1 = 0 x1x3 + x1x2x3 + x2x3 = 0
x1 + x1x2 + x1x3 = 0 x1x2x3 = 0
x1x2 + x1x3 = 0 x1x3 + x2x3 = 0
x1x2x3 + x1x3 = 0 x1x3 + x2x3 = 0
Now we use linearization to get a new system with seven unknowns and 16 equations. Some
of the equations may repeat.
x1 + y12 + x2 = 0 x2 = 0
y12 + x3 = 1 x2 + y12 + y23 = 0
y13 + x2 = 0 z123 + x2 = 0
x1 + y23 + x3 = 1 y12 + x2 = 0
x1 = 0 y13 + z123 + y23 = 0
x1 + y12 + y13 = 0 z123 = 0
y12 + y13 = 0 y13 + y23 = 0
z123 + y13 = 0 y13 + y23 = 0
Using Gauss Elimination we can find a unique solution to the system. The solution will be:
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x1 = 0, x2 = 0, x3 = 1, y12 = 0, y13 = 0, y23 = 0, z123 = 0. It is easy to see that that is the
solution of original system too.
A drawback of XL is that in general, we don’t know the complexity of the algorithm.
However, for proper choices of D it seems to be more efficient than the relinearization method.
In the next chapter, we will see an example of applying this algorithm to one round of
Baby Rijndael.
4.4 The XSL attack on MQ problem
The XL algorithm is designed for overdefined systems of quadratic equations and it seems
to work for most of them. Some MQ problems have the additional property of being sparse,
which means that the equations will be missing many possible quadratic terms. This property
can be used to enchance the attack.
XSL (eXtended Sparse Linearization) was created by Nicolas Courtois and Josef Pieprzyk
in (4). The cipher was designed to crack XSL-ciphers, ciphers in which the system of equations
will be sparse.
Definition 4.4.1. An XSL-cipher is a composition of Nr similar rounds:
X The first round i = 1 starts by XORing the input with the session key Ki−1,
S Then we apply a layer of B bijective S-boxes in parallel, each on s bits,
L Then we apply a linear diffusion layer,
X Then we XOR with another session key Ki. Finally, if i = Nr we finish, otherwise we
increment i and go back to step S.
It is easy to see that AES and Baby Rijndael are both XSL-ciphers. For AES, s = 8,
B = 4 ∗ Nb, where Nb is the number of columns in the state. The number of rounds Nr
depends on the key size. For Baby Rijndael, we have Nr = 4, s = 4 and B = 4, because in
each round we apply 4 S-Boxes.
In the case of the XL attack, the authors of (3) gave the steps in the algorithm. Unfortu-
nately, we don’t have such a definition of XSL, because there are many steps in the algorithm
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that are not clear yet even to those author. However, we do know that XSL will only work for
sparse systems of quadratic equations.
The difference between XL and XSL is that the XL attack will multiply a system of equa-
tions by every possible monomial of degree at most D−2, where D is fixed. The XSL algorithm
suggests multiplying the system of equations only by carefully selected monomials.
XSL will use the system of systems of quadratic equations built for each of the S-boxes.
For each S-box, we will have some system of equations.
First fix a constant P . More details about picking P will be given later. In every step
we will choose one S-box, and call it active. All the other S-boxes will be called passive for
this step. Then we will multiply every equation of the active S-box by all products of P − 1
monomials arising from the passive S-Boxes. We will repeat until every S-box was active
exactly once.
The authors did not present a way of computing an efficient P . If P is very big, then the
attack will be similar to the XL method.
If after applying this algorithm we still do not have enough equations to use the relineariza-
tion or linearization method, Courtois and Pieprzyk in (4) suggest using the T ′ method.
After we have applied the XSL method, we will have a new system of equations. Let T
be the set of monomials we have in those equations. We want to build still more linearly
independent equations. Let Txi be the set of all the monomials from T that will still be in
T when we multiply by xi. For example, let T = {x1, x2, x3, x1 ∗ x2, x2 ∗ x3}. If we work in
GF (2), then for every x ∈ GF (2), x2 = x. Thus Tx1 = {x1, x2, x1 ∗ x2}.
Build Tx1 and Tx2 , and apply Gaussian elimination to both. We will think of every mono-
mial as a new variable, and we want to represent every variable in T −Tx1 as a combination of
variables in Tx1 and every variable in T − Tx2 as a combination of variables in Tx2 . We expect
that some subset of this resulting system will contain only terms in Tx1 , call it C1, and some
subset will contain only terms in Tx2 , call it C2. We would multiply every equation in C1 by x1.
After multiplication we will still have only terms from T in this system, so we can substitute,
and represent every term in this system as a combination of variables in Tx2 . Combine these
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new equations and C2 and multiply each of the equations by x2. Now we should have some
new linearly independent equations. By iterating the process we should get more equations.
There is a toy example for the T ′ method taken from (4) given in Appendix A.
It is not clear how to choose x1 and x2, because sometimes this algorithm fails and does
not give linearly independent equations. However, the authors of the method suggest that if
one system fails, then we should pick some new variables and try the method again. They
say that most of the variables should work. More details can be found in (4). Complexity
estimates for this attack are also given in the paper.
There are two different kinds of MQ attacks on block ciphers. One of them ignores key
schedules, the second one uses key schedules. We should notice that the key schedule of Rijndael
uses the same S-boxes as a round of Rijndael. This is why we can build more equations using
the key schedule. The XSL attack can be applied in both MQ attacks if the block cipher we
use is an XSL-cipher.
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CHAPTER 5. The XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael
5.1 The XL attack on one round of Baby Rijndael
5.1.1 Constructing equations
Every cipher can be represented as a system of equations were the unknowns are key bits
as well as input and output bit. In this section, we will show how to build these equations for
Baby Rijndael. We will build these equations using two different techniques. One way will use
the null space equations for the S-boxes. The other way will use the structure of the S-boxes
we discussed in Section 3.2.
In this section we will use X = (x3, x2, x1, x0) to represent the input to an S-box and
Y = (y3, y2, y1, y0) to represent the output of an S-box.
5.1.1.1 Null space equations
To find the null space equations, we will build a 16×37 matrix. Each row will contain the
values of 37 monomials: {1, x3, . . . , x0, y3, . . . , y0, x3x2, x3x1, . . . , x1x0, x3y3, x3y2, . . . , x0y0, y3y2,
y3y1, . . . , y1y0}, for each of 16 possible inputs of {x3, x2, x1, x0}. See Table 5.1.1.1.
After we build this matrix we can find the null space by row reduction. We use the
Mathematica function NullSpace for this. The null space will give us 21 quadratic equations.
1 + x0x1 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x0x3 + x2x3 + y0y1 + y2 + y3 = 0
x1 + x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x1x3 + y1 + y0y2 + y3 = 0
1 + x0 + x1 + x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x0x3 + y0y1 + y2 + y3 = 0
x0 + x1 + x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + y1 + y2 + y3 + y0y3 = 0
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x0x1 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x2x3 + y0 + y1 + y1y3 = 0
1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + y1 + y2 + y2y3 = 0
x0 + x1 + x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x0y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x3y3 = 0
1 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x1x3 + y0 + x0y1 + y2 + y3 = 0
x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x2x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + x0y2 + y3 = 0
1 + x0 + x1 + x0x1 + x3 + x0x3 + x1x3 + y3 + x0y3 + x3y3 = 0
1 + x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x2x3 + y0 + x1y0 + y1 + y2 + x3y3 = 0
x0 + x1 + x0x1 + x3 + x0x3 + x2x3 + x1y1 + y2 + x3y3 = 0
x0 + x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x1x3 + y1 + y2 + x1y2 + y3 = 0
1 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x1x3 + y0 + y2 + y3 + x1y3 + x3y3 = 0
1 + x2 + x1x2 + x0x3 + x1x3 + x2y0 + y1 + y2 + x3y3 = 0
1 + x1 + x0x1 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x2y1 + y2 + y3 = 0
x1 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x2x3 + y0 + x2y2 + x3y3 = 0
1 + x0 + x1 + x0x1 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3 + y0 + y1 + x2y3 + x3y3 = 0
1 + x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + x2x3 + x3y0 + y1 + y2 = 0
x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x3 + x1x3 + y0 + y1 + x3y1 + y3 + x3y3 = 0
x1 + x0x1 + x2 + x0x2 + x1x2 + x3 + x0x3 + y1 + x3y2 + y3 + x3y3 = 0
This yields 21 equations for each S-box. For one round of Baby Rijndael we will have six
S-boxes: four S-boxes in the round and another two S-boxes in the Key Schedule. This results
in 21 · 6 = 126 equations. How many unknowns will we have? Each S-box has 4 input bits and
4 output bits, so we will have 8 · 6 = 48 simple variables.
In addition to these null space equations, we also have plaintext/ciphertext pair we can use.
We also know something about the structure of Baby Rijndael, so we can reduce the number
of variables that we have. We will do it in Section 5.1.3.
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5.1.1.2 Equations with inverse property
As we showed before, an S-box of Baby Rijndael first finds the inverse element of the
input and then uses affine transformations. Let X = (x3, x2, x1, x0) be the input to S-box and
let Y = (y3, y2, y1, y0) be the output of the S-box. The affine transformation is a one-to-one
function, so there exists an inverse function, call it h. By applying this inverse function to Y , we
will get the inverse element of X. Therefore, we have h(Y ) = X−1, or X ∗ h(Y ) = (0, 0, 0, 1).
We can write four equations based on this relationship by equating each of the bits on the
lefthand side with a bit on the righthand side. We have a problem if X = 0, because then
X ∗h(Y ) = (0, 0, 0, 0). This means that our last equation is incorrect, the righthand side should
be 0 instead of 1. However, we can still use first three equations.
The equations we get are:
x0 + x2 + x3 + x0y0 + x1y0 + x2y0+
+ x3y0 + x0y1 + x1y1 + x0y2 + x2y2 + x1y3 + x2y3 + x3y3 = 0
x1 + x2 + x3 + x0y0 + x1y0 + x2y0+
+ x0y1 + x1y2 + x3y2 + x0y3 + x1y3 + x2y3 + x3y3 = 0
x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x0y0 + x1y0+
+ x3y1 + x0y2 + x2y2 + x3y2 + x0y3 + x1y3 + x2y3 = 0
x1 + x3 + x1y0 + x2y0 + x3y0 + x0y1+
+ x1y1 + x2y1 + x0y2 + x1y2 + x3y2 + x0y3 + x2y3 + x3y3 = 1
In our attack we will use all four equations for each S-box, because for one round it is not
likely that X = (0, 0, 0, 0). If we find out that there is no solution for our system of equations,
we will erase the “bad” equations from our system and recompute it. We will do the same if
the solution we found is wrong; that is, if the solution does not propertly encrypt the given
plaintext to the ciphertext. We always can check if the key we found is the correct one by
encrypting the plaintext with this key and checking that we get the same ciphertext we have.
For each S-box we will build four equations, so we have another 4 · 6 = 24 equations (for
total of 150 equations) and still 8 · 6 = 48 variables. We will reduce the number of unknowns
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in the next section.
For our convenience, we will rewrite the last equation in the form:
x1 + x3 + x1y0 + x2y0 + x3y0 + x0y1 + x1y1+
+ x2y1 + x0y2 + x1y2 + x3y2 + x0y3 + x2y3 + x3y3 + 1 = 0
5.1.1.3 Decrease number of variables
One round of Baby Rijndael can be represented as Figure 5.1. This is why we can represent
every input of every S-box as a plaintext XOR an initial key and every output of every S-box
as a ciphertext XOR a round key. In this way we can already decrease the number of variables
from 48 to 8 · 4 = 32, the number of bits in the initial key and the round key.
Output
Round
key
Input
Initial
key
X
S-Box
Y
Linear Part
Z
Figure 5.1 One round of Baby Rijndael.
Until now, we have only used the structure of a Baby Rijndael round. We have not used
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the KeySchedule yet. This will give us even more information and allow us to further decrease
the number of unknowns. Let K =
k0 k2
k1 k3
. If we go back to Section 3.1.2, then we see
that w3 = w1 ⊕ w2. This means that the second column of the round key is the XOR of the
second column of the initial key and the first column of the round key. In this way we can get
rid of 8 more variables, leaving us with only 24 variables.
In the next section, we will solve the system of 150 quadratic equations with 24 variables
using the XL attack.
5.1.2 Applying XL attack on equations
In the last section, we ended up with m = 150 quadratic equations and n = 24 simple
variables. We want to solve this system in order to find the secret key. We can’t use a
linearization method directly because n2 = 576 and m  n22 , so we need more equations. We
will get these equations by applying the XL attack.
Let’s denote the system of equations we have by S. The XL method uses a constant integer
D ≥ n√
m
= 24√
150
≈ 1.96. We want D to be as small as possible, because D will be the degree
of the new system, but D must be larger than two, which is the degree of the current system,
so we take D = 3. This means that we should multiply every equation in S by every original
variable, because D − 2 = 1.
After this multiplication we get 150*24=3600 equation plus the original 150 equations,
so we have a total of 3750 equations with at most ( 243 ) + (
24
2 ) + 24 = 2324 monomials. This
countsevery possible cubic, quadratic or single term. Now we can use the linearization method.
We will replace every monomial by a new variable, but we will not rename the original variables.
For example, each xixjxk = aijk, xixj = aij and if we have in some equation just xi it will
remain xi.
Remember that we are in the field GF (2). This means we have some “rules” that are not
true in general, but are true in this field. For example, x2 = x, x3 = x, 2x = 0, 3x = x, etc. We
will apply these rules to make our system easier to solve.
The initial idea was to use the Solve command in Mathematica to solve this linear system
37
of equations, but it did not work out. It took a lot of time to perform the algorithm and then
gave an error message or ran out of RAM. Then we built a 3750×2325 matrix. Each of the
first 2324 columns will represent a variable we might have in our system of equations and the
last column will represent the constant term. Each row is an equation from our system. To
solve the system of equations, we used Mathematica to find the Row Reduced Form of this
matrix. It took less than one minute to reduce the matrix.
The matrix in Row Reduced Form had a rank of 2292. This means that we have more than
one solution. We actually found four different solutions using the equations. We checked all of
them using the plaintext and ciphertext that we had. All four solutions we found encrypted
the plaintext we have to the ciphertext we have. So in our case the attack worked pretty well.
5.2 XL and XSL attack on four round Baby Rijndael
5.2.1 Equations for four round Baby Rijndael
We want to represent Baby Rijndael as an MQ problem. Further, we will use the null space
equations and properties of the S-boxes. The null space equations will stay the same as they
were in Section 5.1.1. One round of Baby Rijndael uses the same S-boxes as four round Baby
Rijndael, so again let X = (x3, x2, x1, x0) be the input to the S-box and let Y = (y3, y2, y1, y0)
be the output of the S-box. Let h be the inverse function of the affine part of the S-box, just
as in Section 5.1.2. Then X ∗ h(Y ) = (0, 0, 0, 1), unless X = (0, 0, 0, 0).
In four round Baby Rijndael, we have four S-boxes for each round and another eight S-
boxes in the Key Schedule, so we have a total of 24 S-boxes. This means that we will have
21 · 24 = 504 null space equations and another 4 · 24 = 96 equations from the inverse property.
Therefore, we have a total of 600 equations. We have four input bits to each S-box and four
output bits for each S-box, which gives 8 · 24 = 192 variables.
As in Section 5.1.3, we can reduce the number of variables. See Figure 5.2. We can represent
each output of an S-box as the input to the next S-box XOR with the round key. We know
the plaintext and ciphertext and we can represent the input to the first round S-box as the
plaintext XOR the initial key (K0). The output of the last round S-box will be the ciphertext
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XOR the round key (K4). As in the last chapter, we have only eight (not 16) new bits for
each round key, because we can represent the other eight bits using eight bits we have and an
initial key or another round key.
Figure 5.2 Four rounds of Baby Rijndael.
In this way, we can reduce the number of original variables to n = 96. If we compute
n2
2 we get 4608. We only have 600 equations, so we don’t have enough equations to use the
linearization method. We need more equations.
First, we will use the inverse property of the S-boxes again. We know X ∗h(Y ) = (0, 0, 0, 1),
and this means that X2 ∗ h(Y ) = X and X ∗ h(Y )2 = h(Y ). If we look at this bitwise, we
will get eight new equations for each S-box and they are linearly independent of the original
inverse equations. Now we have total of 504 + (8 · 24) = 792 equations. This is better, but still
not enough!
After we built the equations, we computed the actual number of monomials we have in
the equations, and we had 2332 different monomials. If we compute the possible number of
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quadratic and single terms we can have using 96 different variables, we will get ( 962 ) + 96 =
4656 monomials. We can conclude that we have the sparse property in our equations, many
monomials are missing.
5.2.2 The XL method for four round Baby Rijndael
We have a system of n = 96 original variables and m = 792 quadratic equations. Let’s
compute the value of D we need to solve such a system using the XL method:
D ≥ n√
m
=
96√
792
≈ 3.41.
Therefore, D = 4. This means we should multiply each equation of our system by each possible
single term and each possible quadratic monomial. We already computed this number in the
last section, the number is 4656. This means we will have a total of 792·4656+792 = 3, 688, 344
equations with ( 964 ) + (
96
3 ) + (
96
2 ) + 96 = 3, 469, 496 variables. We have more equations than
unknowns and we hope the system will have unique solution.
Recall that in Section 5.1.2, we showed that the four equations we get from X ∗ h(Y ) =
(0, 0, 0, 1) are true only in the case that X 6= 0, but we can not be sure that this condition
holds. Therefore, it might be better to drop the equation we get using the first bit. Then
we will have only three equations for each S-box, and it will reduce our system of equations
to 792 − 24 = 768 quadratic equations. The number of variables will remain the same. The
XL method in this case will have 768 · 4656 + 768 = 3, 576, 576 equations. We still have more
equations than unknowns and we hope to have unique solution.
Actually, when we run the attack the numbers look even more promising. Some of the
unknowns we have counted do not appear in the system of equations at all. The number of
equations was larger than number of unknowns by almost a million.
Unfortunately, when we ran SPSOLVERMOD2 on this system the result is not as we hoped.
Many of equations were linearly dependent and too many equations canceled out. We had more
than 2100000 possible solutions. Even if we compare it to a brute force attack on original AES,
which involves checking 2256 possible solutions, the results look really bad. However, the XL
40
method does not use the sparse property of equations, but the XSL method uses it. In the
next section, we use the XSL method to crack Baby Rijndael.
5.2.3 The XSL method for four round Baby Rijndael
5.2.3.1 The XSL method using one block of plaintext
We have a system of n = 96 original variables and m = 792 quadratic equations, but with
only 2332 monomials. For the XL method, we had the parameter D; for the XSL method we
need to decide on a parameter P . Unfortunately, we don’t have a formula to compute P .
We know that P should be bigger than 1, so let’s try to take P = 2. Then the algorithm we
gave in Section 4.4 says we should multiply every equation of the fixed — active S-box by all
products of P − 1 monomials arising from all the other — passive S-boxes. We should repeat
this multiplication until every S-box is active exactly once.
How many equations will we build and how many monomials will we have? For each S-box
we have 21 + 4 + 8 = 33 equations. Let ti be the number of monomials in the passive S-boxes
when S-box number i is active. Using Mathematica we calculated the value of these ti’s. See
Table 5.2.3.1.
We will have 1,807,740 equations. Now we should check how many monomials we have
in these equations. We can find an upper bound on the number of monomials by considering
what kind of monomials we have in our system of equations. Each monomial has degree of
at most four. If we calculate all possible monomials of degree less than or equal to four of
96 variables, we will get 3,469,496. However, we had only 2332 monomials in our original
system, and then we multiplied only by these monomials so actually we can represent it as
( 23322 ) + 2332 = 2, 720, 278 monomials at most. This number is smaller, but still not good
enough. Using Mathematica we found that the actual number of monomials in our system
is 1,723,469. This means that we have more equations than variables and the system should
be solvable. We need to replace every monomial by a new variable to get a linear system of
equations and then we should be able to solve this system. However, when we actually tried
to solve the system using SPSOLVERMOD2 the number of possible solutions again was near
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2100000.
In the paper (4), the authors mention that for the attack to be successful one should use
multiple of blocks of plaintextx and corresponding ciphertext. Recall from Section 2.1 that
the false-positive probability for a key is 1 − e−2m−n where n is a block size and m is a key
size. For Baby Rijndael we used m = n = 16. When we use one block of the plaintext we
have 1 − e−216−16 = 1 − 1e = 0.63. It mean that the probability of having at least two keys is
very high. This explain to some level why we have so many possible solutions. The system
of equations we have, not only contains the keys and state variable, but it also includes the
variables we created by multiplication of original variables with monomial. So by expecting at
least two possible solutions for key bits we expect many solutions for the whole system.
In the next section we apply XSL attack on four round Baby Rijndael with two blocks of
known plaintext and corresponding ciphertext.
5.2.3.2 The XSL method using two blocks of plaintext
Until now we were applying XS and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael assuming we only know
one block of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext. However, a message can have more than
one block that is encrypted using the same key. Assume we know two blocks of plaintext
and corresponding ciphertext. We know that a message was encrypted using four round Baby
Rijndael. Then we can create two sets of equations from Section 5.1.3, one for the first block
of the message and another for the second block. Those two sets of equation will share the
same key bits.
For one block we had a system of n = 96 original variables and m = 792 quadratic
equations, but with only 2332 monomials. For two blocks we will have n = 144 original
variable and m = 1264 equations (the key variables and key schedule equations are the same
for both sets). We will take P = 2 again. Then the algorithm discussed in Section 4.4 says we
should multiply every equation of the fixed — active S-box by all products of P −1 monomials
arising from all the other — passive S-boxes. We should repeat this multiplication until every
S-box is active exactly once. We apply this attack on each set of equations separately. Then
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combine both sets of equations together. We received a system of linear equations with 3909262
unknowns and 10094976 equations.
The false-positive probability for two blocks of Baby Rijndael is 1 − e−232−16 = 1 − e−16
since block size equal to 32 and the key size is still 16. This probability is quite small for us
to hope that a unique key exists. Thus it is reasonable to hope that the system will not have
many solutions.
SPSOLVERMOD2 was used to solve this system of linear equations. The system expands
rapidly. At some point we have an input with intermediate matrix of 132GB. at this point we
were unable to solve the system. However, after performing 3245000 pivots on original matrix,
we still have only 3909262 unknowns and 7732113 equations. So we still hope to have a unique
solution.
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PART II
Linear Algebra: Methods for solving sparse systems of linear
equations
46
CHAPTER 6. Direct Methods: Gauss Elimination
In Chapter 5 we applied XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael. As a result we obtained
large sparse systems of linear equations over the field GF (2) that we needed to solve. Solving
linear systems is a well known linear algebra problem and many algorithms exist. This Chapter
explores this field and explains in details why we used Gauss Elimination for our purpose.
6.1 Introduction
Finding a solution to a system of linear equations Ax = b is an important and very common
problem in linear algebra. The system can have no solutions, a unique solution or many
solutions. Many real life problems can be reduced to a problem of solving a system of linear
equations (23), (26). Depending on the application it might be enough to find one of the
possible solutions of the system, while in others all solutions must be found. In our case we
must find all possible solution. Recall from Chapter 5 that in our systems the unknowns
represent key bits. Any of the possible solutions can be the one we are looking for. Some of
the solutions also can be incorrect for our original system, since linearization adds constrains
we don’t have in the linear system. For example, we replaced x1x2 by a12. If we get a solution
were x1 = x2 = 1 we must also have a12 = 1. However, we don’t have this constrain in linear
system, so some of the solutions might be needed to weed out.
The methods for solving linear systems are divided into two classes: direct and iterative.
While iterative solvers have become more and more efficient in finding one of the solutions, only
direct methods can be used to find them all. Many software packages such as SuperLU (11)
and ScaLAPACK (14) use direct methods and are very efficient at solving systems of linear
equations. Most of those packages only work for specific classes of matrices that represent the
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system, for example symmetric or square matrices. Also almost all of them are designed to
operate over the real or complex numbers, but not over a finite field. Solving systems over the
reals fundamentally involves approximation. The methods typically rely on the continuity of
the underlying field. When operating over a finite field such tools are not available. One must
find exact solutions and compute them directly.
As we mentioned before the iterative methods will not work because they find only one
possible solution. Some of those methods don’t have any randomness in them. The solution
they find will be always the same. However, even if we do have randomness and are able to find
different solutions by running such algorithm many times, still this will not solve our problem.
We need to know how many solutions we have in order to know how many solutions we should
find. This can be done only by finding the rank of the matrix, which involves direct methods
too.
Our goal is to find all possible solutions of a large sparse systems of linear equations over
the field GF (2). We use Gauss Elimination because it is an efficient algorithm for GF (2) (18).
We also use reordering process to reduce fill-in.
6.2 Definitions.
First we recall the definition of a field from Section 2.1.2.
Definition 6.2.1. A field is a set F together with the binary operations addition (+) and
multiplication (·) on F such that:
1. (F ,+) is an abelian group with identity 0.
2. (F − {0}, ·) is an abelian group with identity 1.
3. For all a, b, c ∈ F , a · (b+ c) = (a · b) + (a · c).
Both the real numbers and the complex numbers are examples of fields. In this thesis we
are concerned with the field GF (2) with underlying set {0, 1} and addition given by
0 + 0 = 1 + 1 = 0, 0 + 1 = 1 + 0 = 1.
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Multiplication is the usual product of integers. Note that both addition and multiplication can
be thought of as operating on integers modulo 2.
The system of linear equations over the field GF (2) is a system:
a11x1 + a12x2 + ...+ a1nxn = b1
a21x1 + a22x2 + ...+ a2nxn = b2
...
am1x1 + am2x2 + ...+ amnxn = bm
where aij ∈ GF (2), for all i = 1 . . .m, j = 1 . . . n.
We can form an augmented matrix [A | b] for this system:

a11 a12 . . . a1n b1
a21 a22 . . . a2n b2
...
...
. . .
...
...
am1 am2 . . . amn bm

Definition 6.2.2. A row rank of the matrix is a maximum number of linearly independent
rows.
Definition 6.2.3. A matrix is in row echelon form if
1. all zero-rows are at the bottom of the matrix and
2. the first nonzero entry in each row (called the pivot) is equal to 1 and
3. the pivot occurs to the right of the pivot in the preceding row.
The act of performing a set of row operations to achieve the second condition is called pivoting.
Note that the number of non-zero rows in the row reduced form of a matrix is equal to the
row-rank of the matrix.
Definition 6.2.4. A matrix is in row-reduced echelon form (RREF) if
1. all zero-rows are at the bottom of the matrix and
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2. the first nonzero entry in each row is equal to 1 (called leading 1) and
3. the pivot occurs to the right of the leading 1 in the preceding row and
4. in a column containing a leading 1, all other entries of the column are equal to 0.
6.3 Gaussian Elimination
Gaussian Elimination, named after German mathematician Carl Friedreich Gauss, is a
common method for solving systems of linear equation. It can be used to solve systems over
any field. Given a system of linear equations in matrix form:
a11 a12 . . . a1n
a21 a22 . . . a2n
...
...
. . .
...
am1 am2 . . . amn


x1
x2
...
xn

=

b1
b2
...
bm

First form an augmented matrix:
a11 a12 . . . a1n b1
a21 a22 . . . a2n b2
...
...
. . .
...
...
am1 am2 . . . amn bm

Then apply a sequence of elementary row operations to transform the matrix to the row echelon
form (9). The elementary row operations are:
1. Multiply a row by a non-zero member of the field (this operations is useless for matrices
over GF (2)).
2. Swap two rows.
3. Add c times one row to another for some c in the field (for GF (2) matrices the only
choice for c is c = 1).
Finally to find the solution use back-substitution to find the elements of the vector x.
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The complexity of Gauss Elimination Algorithm is O(n3). Gauss-Jordan Elimination al-
gorithm is similar to Gauss Elimination algorithm and transforms matrix to RREF. It has the
same complexity.
One of the benefits of applying the algorithms on matrices over the field GF (2) is that
one’s cancel each other. Subtracting pivot row 10100101 from a row 10001101 will result in
00101000. During Gauss Elimination a matrix can increase size. However, the GF (2) property
we just discussed hopefully decreases this problem.
Another advantage of using Gauss Elimination for our purpose is that this algorithm can
be easily parallelized. Every process is in charge of a set of rows. Given a pivot row every
process will perform pivoting on its set of rows. See details about our parallel implementation
of the algorithm in Section 8.6.
6.4 Reordering
A sparse matrix is described as a matrix that has very few non-zero elements. One of
the main challenges of Gaussian Elimination even when starting with a sparse matrix is the
increasing size of the matrix as row operations are applied. This phenomenon is referred to
as “fill-in”. By performing an initial rearrangement of the rows or columns (or both) of the
matrix, one can hope to reduce the degree of fill-in.
Definition 4. Let A be an n × n matrix and pi = {i1, i2, ..., in} be a permutation of the
set {1, 2, ..., n} . Then a matrix Api,∗ = {api(i),j}i=1,...,n;j=1,...,n is called the row pi-permutation
of A and A∗,pi = {ai,pi(i)}i=1,...,n;j=1,...,n is called the column pi-permutation of A. Furthermore,
Api,∗ = PpiA,A∗,pi = AQpi where Ppi and Qpi are permutation matrices.
An appropriate reordering applied on the matrix before performing Gaussian Eliminations
can decrease fill-in (19), (24). Some of the well known algorithms are Cuthill-McKee (20)
and minimum degree reordering (8). Unfortunately, most of these algorithms work only for
symmetric matrices. We needed a method which will work for any matrix. A simple reordering
can be done by permuting the columns of the matrix in such a way that columns with many
non-zero entries are positioned to the right. In this way the earliest pivots will operate on
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the sparsest rows. By the time we reach the least sparse columns many of the entries can be
canceled out.
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PART III
High Performance Computing: SPSOLVEMOD2
53
CHAPTER 7. Introduction
High Performance computing (HPC) has a broad definition. Most often HPC is associated
with a (parallel) supercomputer. HPC is the use of parallel processing for running advanced
application programs efficiently, reliably and quickly.
In order to find all possible solutions of a large sparse system of linear equations over the
field GF (2) we needed to utilize High Performance techniques. We use parallel computing
techniques in order to solve the problem in a quick and efficient way.
There are two common memory models. The first one is the shared memory model where
the processors are connected to a global available memory (Figure 7.1). The second one, is the
distributed memory model where each processor has its own memory (Figure 7.2).
Figure 7.1 Shared Memory Model.
It has become common to have a distributed shared model in which each processor has
access to shared memory and also has non-shared private memory.
Most of the systems we had access to were distributed memory systems, so our software was
implemented to work in the distributed memory model. The most common parallel language
used for this model is the MPI (Message Passing Interface) standard. MPI is a protocol for
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Figure 7.2 Distributed Memory Model.
passing messages between processors that are tied together. MPI has point-to-point messages
like MPI Send and MPI Recive between two processors as well as collective messages like
MPI Broadcast between all the processors. MPI works with Fortran, C or C++ languages
where MPI commands are used for message passing and the serial language is used for serial
commands loops, if statements, computations. For our purpose MPI C language was preferred
since the structure we used to store the data contained lots of pointers (see Section 8.1 for
details).
Parallel programming can be more complicated than serial programming. Concurrency
introduces several new problems such as race condition and deadlocks. Race conditions occurs
when threads (also called processes, subtasks) try to update the same variable, or write to the
same place in output file simultaneously. For example, let thread 0 update x to be 2 and then
to print value of x on the screen. Let thread 1 update value of x to be 4. Both threads work
concurrently, and thread 0 can print x=2 or x=4 depending on the order of executions.
The deadlock occurs when one thread tries to communicate with another thread that does
not expect the communication call. Assume thread 0 wants to send a message to thread 1.
Then thread 1 must be waiting to receive the message.
Not all algorithms can benefit from parallelization. Some algorithms are strictly serial
because they contain chains of dependent calculations (critical paths). Although, optimally
the speed-up from parallelization would be linear; doubling the number of processing elements
should halve the runtime. However, most programs have a near-linear speed-up for small
numbers of processing elements, which flattens out into a constant value for large numbers of
55
processing elements.
In the next chapter we provide implementation details of SPSOLVERMOD2. In Chapter
9 we present experimental results for random matrices.
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CHAPTER 8. SPSOLVEMOD2 Solver: Implementation Overview
SPSOLVERMOD2 is a parallel software package implemented in the MPI C language. It’s
primary application is the determination of all possible solutions of a general sparse linear
system over the field GF (2). In this chapter we describe the design of the solver.
8.1 General Information
Every system of linear equations can be represented as an augmented matrix where the
last column represents the solution vector. From now on we will use the matrix representation.
Since our solver works with systems of linear equations over the field GF (2) the matrix can
have only 0 or 1 entries.
x1 + x3 = 0
x1 + x3 + x5 = 1
x2 + x5 = 0
x3 + x4 = 1

1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1

Figure 8.1 Conversion of a system of equations into augmented matrix.
SPSOLVERMOD2 is a parallel solver which takes a matrix that represents a system of
linear equations as it’s input. It first reorders the matrix, then finds the row reduced echelon
form of the matrix and finally finds all possible solutions. The software is divided into thee
parts to make it easier to use. When dealing with a smaller system of linear equations, there
is no need to apply the reordering algorithm as it does not yield any speed-up, see the results
in the last section. Also some of our cryptography matrices ended up having lots of solutions,
2100000 or more. In this case, the solution file has size close to 2100000 · n · sizeof(int) where n
is number of unknowns. In that case we don’t use the third part of the solver.
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8.2 Data Structure: Matrixblock
There are several ways to store a sparse matrix A. It is common to keep only non-zero
elements of the matrix, their value and location to reduce the storing space. One of the simplest
ways is the so-called coordinate format (24). The data structure consists of three arrays of the
same length:
1. a real array containing all the values of the non-zero elements of A in any order;
2. an integer array containing the row index of the corresponding entry in the first array;
3. a second integer array containing the column indices.
Most of the time the elements are listed in row or column order. However, this storage method
has a disadvantage: it is hard to add or delete elements from the matrix. During the pivoting
process the matrix changes constantly. This is why we used a linked list format with some
modifications. An array of size equal to the number of rows, points to a list corresponding to
the row. Each element of the list stores the position and value of an element in a row.
Since we work over the field GF (2) there is no need to store the value of the matrix entry.
It is always equal to 1. This structure gives us flexibility to change only a small part of the
data structure when a row is modified.
In the distributed memory model, every thread can only see his data. It is memory con-
suming to store the whole matrix on each thread. This is why we divide the matrix into np
(number of processors) separate blocks. Each block contains almost the same number of equa-
tion #equationsnp . Each thread stores one Matrixblock, where the first thread keeps information
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about the first #equationsnp matrix rows in it’s Matrixblock, the second thread keeps information
about the next #equationsnp matrix rows in it’s Matrixblock, and so on.
Our structure, Matrixblock, also has a couple of supporting arrays. An array that stores
the first element in each row and an array that stores the location and value of the current
element. The current element is an element of the row that is closest to the current pivot
(must be equal or larger than the pivot). Below is the definition of Matrixblock from the code.
s t r u c t {
i n t nAl lEquat ions ; // Number o f equat ion
i n t nAllUnknowns ; // Number o f unknowns
i n t f i r s t E q u a t i o n ; // Number o f the f i r s t equat ion
s to r ed on pro c e s s o r
i n t nEquations ; // Number o f equat ions s to r ed on proc e s s o r
i n t ∗nUnknownsByEquation ; // Array , nUnknownsByEquation [ i ] i s number
o f nonzero unknowns in equat ion i
i n t ∗∗unknownsByEquation ; // Array o f po in te r s , unknownsByEquation [ i ]
po in t s to array r e p r e s e n t i n g equat ion i
long nUnknowns ;
i n t ∗ current Index ; // Array , f o r each equat ion i t g i v e s an
index o f an element used the l a s t
i n t ∗ currentValue ; // Array , f o r each equat ion i t g i v e s a
value o f an element used the l a s t
i n t ∗ f i r s t V a l u e ; // Array , f o r each equat ion i t g i v e s a
value o f the f i r s t unknown in i t
}
typede f matrixBlock ;
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8.3 I/O
The systems of linear equations derived from our cryptography problem were very large.
The size of the input files was close to 1GB. For this reason we wanted efficient I/O procedures.
Read and write functions were implemented using MPI I/O routines. The read function reads
the input file and stores it as the data structure described above. The write function stores
data from the structure into an output file. The output and input files have the same format.
The write function is also used when an intermediate matrix should be saved. This turned out
to be very handy when we encountered the walltime limits.
Unfortunately, lightning (one of the machines we used) had only one file infiniband. This
made parallel I/O functions useless. Actually those routines cause trouble for the file system.
This is why a different version of I/O was written using only serial reads and writes.
In order to save space and make I/O more efficient our solver takes as input a binary file.
The file contains the dimensions of the matrix followed by the number of non-zero entries in
each row. Finally, the file includes row-by-row positions of the non-zero entries. See Figure
8.2 for an example. This helps to calculate offsets for the read commands. Each thread get
the same number of rows (the number may differ by one). Every row is stored only on one
thread. A thread first calculates which rows are his, then where the information about his
rows is stored. This can be easily done by first reading the number of elements in each of
his rows. Sum the non-zero elements on every thread and distribute the information between
the threads using MPI Scan routine. The MPI Scan will return the amount of non-zero
elements stored on all threads with smaller ranks.
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1
 4 6 2 4 2 3 1 3 1 3 5 6 2 5 3 4 6
Figure 8.2 Matrix and corresponding input file.
After we finish reading all the equations, we close the file and update supporting arrays.
At the beginning, all these arrays point to, or store, the value of the first non-zero element
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in each equation. By the end of I/O read function, the Matrixblock structure on each thread
is filled with information and ready for the next step. This step can be reordering, finding
the row reduced echelon form or constructing the solutions. See Figure 8.3 for example of
Matrixblocks constructed using an input file.
nAllEquations = 4; 
nAllUnknowns = 6; 
firstEquation = 0; 
nEquations = 2;
*nUnknownsByEquation:
**unknownsByEquation:
nUnknowns = 6;
*currentIndex:
*currentValue
*firstValue
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00
11
Processor 0
11
31
6531
nAllEquations = 4; 
nAllUnknowns = 6; 
firstEquation = 2; 
nEquations = 2;
*nUnknownsByEquation:
**unknownsByEquation:
nUnknowns = 5;
*currentIndex:
*currentValue
*firstValue
32
00
32
Processor 1
32
52
643
Figure 8.3 Matrixblock for input file from Figure 8.2 and 2 processors.
The write function works in a similar manner. At the completion of the write function
a new file with so called state matrix is created. The output and input files have the same
format, so if needed the output file can be used as input file for SPSOLVERMOD2.
Implementing I/O so that each thread only reads/writes its own information, saves quite
a bit of time. In the Experimental Results section it is shown that for many random matrices
the reading and writing parts take only seconds. When our original cryptography matrices
where checked, the reading time for an approximately 1GB matrix took less than a minute,
while writing an approximately 8GB output file took an hour.
61
8.4 Reorder
We have discovered that without some preprocessing, Gaussian elimination, even on a very
sparse matrix, is prone to considerable fill-in. For example a 5, 000, 000 × 5, 000, 000 matrix
containing approximately 32 entries/row grew 8-fold after only 150, 000 pivots. Row operations
on such large matrices becomes very CPU-intensive. For this reason we decided to implement
the following simple reordering scheme.
1. Build a table containing, for each column, the column number and the number of non-zero
entries in each column (the column count).
2. Sort the table on the column count (use quick sort).
3. Reorder/rename the columns so that the sparsest columns appear first.
In this way the earliest pivots operate on the most sparse columns. One hopes that by
the time we reach the least sparse columns, many of the entries will have canceled out. This
approach has shown good results for our cryptography matrices. While we were unable to find
the row reduced form of a 5, 000, 000× 5, 000, 000 matrix containing approximately 32 entries
per row even in a couple of 12 hour runs on 128 threads, after reordering the same task was
achieved in less than 12 hours.
8.5 Load Balance
We begin by evenly distributing the rows to the various threads. What frequently happens
is that after a number of pivots, the rows owned by one thread have grown considerably, while
those of another thread, not at all. The result is that the first thread runs out of memory
while the second’s memory is underutilized.
To address this problem, a load-balancing algorithm was devised. We shall refer to the
total number of nonzero entries in all of the rows assigned to a particular thread as its “thread-
count”. An upper threshold (u) and a lower threshold (`) are set. Whenever the thread-count
on at least one thread exceeds u load-balancing is performed. Every thread with thread-count
62
larger than ` is paired with a thread whose count lies below `. The two threads exchange rows
in an effort to balance their thread-counts, see Figure 8.4. When load-balancing, we pair the
most loaded thread with the least loaded, etc. If we run out of threads with counts below `,
we report that load-balancing is impossible.
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Figure 8.4 Load Balance.
Since load-balancing is time-consuming, the threshold u should be set fairly high so that the
algorithm is invoked only when truly needed. One subtle point to note: when load-balancing,
rows are exchanged between threads. By doing this, the number of rows per thread remains
constant. There is a reason for this. If, for example, one thread owned 5 very dense rows while
a second had 100 sparse rows, when performing a row operation there is a good chance that
the first thread will wind up waiting for the second to finish.
8.6 Gauss Elimination
Gaussian elimination is designed to transform an arbitrary matrix into row-echelon form.
As we explained earlier, the rows of the matrix are distributed uniformly among the threads.
Let k denote the number of rows per thread. At the start of the process, (before any load-
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balancing) thread 0 will own the first k rows, thread 1, the next k, etc.
In the usual approach to Gaussian Elimination one starts with row 1 and applies row
operations in order to eliminate all entries in column 1 below the pivot. After this, row 1
column 1 is a pivot element and we can ignore column 1 for the remainder of the algorithm.
Then one moves on to row 2, column 2 and repeats the process.
However if one implements this standard approach on our parallel framework, one finds
that after k pivots, thread 0 has nothing to do. For this reason we instead reduce our matrix
to what we shall call “unordered reduced row-echelon form”. That is, instead of working top-
to-bottom, we choose the pivot row according to a different strategy (we still choose the pivot
column from left-to-right). Also we eliminate all other entries in the pivot column, not just
those below the pivot. This strategy reduces communication costs.
Below is a description of the algorithm. Note that since it is a parallel algorithm every
thread executes all lines.
f o r ( p ivot =1; pivot<#unknowns ; p ivot++){
1 . Among a l l p o s s i b l e p ivot rows owned by you , choose one
with the s m a l l e s t number , Rt , o f nonzero e n t r i e s .
2 . D i s t r i b u t e Rt to a l l other threads .
3 . Choose a thread tmin with minimal va lue o f Rt .
4 . Thread tmin broadcast p ivot row to a l l threads .
5 . f o r ( j =0; j<k ; j++){
I f the re i s 1 in column pivot , e l i m i n a t e i t us ing p ivot row .
}
}
In step 1–3 we chose a pivot row. We do it using a supporting array that stores value of the
first element in the row. In step 5 we need to check if a row has a 1 in pivot column. This is
easily done using a supporting array that stores each row’s current element. We update those
arrays when we eliminate the 1 in the pivot column.
Although, it is easy to say “eliminate 1 from row r”, in real life such a routine has many if
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statements. If statements always take time. In order to decrease the amount of ifs every row
has an extra element at the end with a large value (think of it as∞). By using this trick there
is no need to check if either the pivot row or row r has elements left.
Here is how it works. Lets call the pivot row pr, where r is a row we want to eliminate 1
from and nr will be a new row we are building. Call function with i = 0, j = 0 and k = 0.
func t i on ( i , j , k , pr , nr , r ){
i f ( pr [ i ]< r [ j ] ) {
nr [ k]=pr [ i ] ;
r e turn func t i on ( i +1, j , k+1,pr , nr , r ) ;
}
e l s e {
i f ( pr [ i ]> r [ j ] ) {
nr [ k]= r [ j ] ;
r e turn func t i on ( i , j +1,k+1,pr , nr , r ) ;
}
e l s e {
i f ( pr [ i ]== i n f i n i t y ){
nr [ k]= i n f i n i t y ;
r e turn new row ;
}
e l s e
re turn func t i on ( i +1, j +1,k , pr , nr , r ) ;
}
}
}
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8.7 Finding the Solutions
The last part of SPSOLVERMOD2 finds all possible solutions of the system of equations
over the field GF (2). Given a matrix in unordered row reduced echelon form the routine:
1. Check if solution exits — look for 0=1 equation. If such an inconsistency exists, print“NO
SOLUTION”.
2. Check if only one solution exists — use the rank. If so, find the solution and store in
solution output file.
3. If more then one solution exists:
(a) Find all the free variables and create a vector that will hold an assigned value.
Think of the vector as a binary number.
(b) Start with assignment of all zeros to free variables (binary number 0).
(c) Calculate solution and store it in solution file.
(d) Change the assignment by adding 1 to binary number. Repeat c until all free
variables have value 1.
The solution file has the number of solutions, length of each solution, and then the solutions
one after another. The running time of this part depends on number of possible solutions.
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CHAPTER 9. SPSOLVEMOD2 Solver: Experimental Results
9.1 Experimental Platforms
Experiments presented here were carried out on four typical platforms: ISU’s Blue Gene/L
supercomputer CyBlue (10), ISU’s Lightning (12) AMD Opteron cluster, ISU’s LightningSMP
(13) AMD Opteron cluster of SMP nodes and the GdX cluster from the Grid’5000 experimental
grid (2).
CyBlue has 1024 nodes, each node containing two dual-core PPC 440 CPUs running at
700Mhz, with 512MB of RAM per node. We compiled the application using GCC compiler with
the -O3 optimization flag. CyBlue uses a custom version of MPICH as its MPI communication
library. The system uses FC for the high speed interconnect.
Lightning is an AMD Opteron cluster with 592 processor cores (148 nodes) with each node
having 8 GBytes of memory (1182 GB total memory on the cluster). Nodes are interconnected
with a high performance InfiniPath HTX communication network for MPI communication
and a Gigabit Ethernet switch for I/O, management, and PBS communication. The commu-
nication library we used is MPICH and the nodes are booted under Linux 2.6.9-42ELsmp.
We compiled the application using the Pathscale compiler with optimization options -O2 -
OPT:wrap around unsafe opt=OFF.
LightningSMP is an AMD Opteron cluster of SMP nodes. We used 16-core nodes (quad
processor, quad core) with 64 GB of memory each. Nodes are interconnected with an In-
finiband communication network for low latency/high bandwidth MPI communication and a
Gigabit Ethernet switch for I/O, management, and PBS communication. The communication
library we used is OpenMPI (7) and the nodes are booted under Linux 2.6.18-128.1.10.el5. We
compiled the application using Pathscale with -O2 optimization flag.
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The last platform we used is the Grid’5000 experimental testbed, a dedicated reconfigurable
and controllable experimental platform featuring 13 clusters, each with 58 to 342 PCs, inter-
connected through Renater (the French Educational and Research wide area Network). We
used up to 256 nodes from the GdX cluster that features two AMD Opteron 246 and 250,
running at 2.0 and 2.4 GHz. Nodes are interconnected through a GigaEthernet network and
booted under Linux 2.6.26. The MPI library we used is Open MPI 1.3. We compiled the
application using GCC 4.2 with -O3 optimization flag.
9.2 Random Matrices
In order to evaluate the performance of the software, a set of test matrices was required.
For this Dr. Bergman generated a series of random, sparse matrices over GF (2) of various sizes
and ranks. The rank of a matrix is the number of pivot elements in its row-echelon form. The
co-rank (also known as the nullity) of a matrix is the difference between the number of columns
and the rank. A system Ax = b over GF (2) will have either no solutions or 2c solutions, where
c is the co-rank of the matrix A.
Our strategy for generating a random m×n matrix over GF (2) with co-rank c and m > n
is quite simple.
1. Create an m× n matrix with 1’s on the first n− c diagonal entries and 0’s elsewhere.
2. Randomly insert 1’s to the right of the n− c diagonal entries.
3. Repeatedly choose, at random, distinct indices i and j and add row i to row j.
4. Finally apply a random permutation of the rows of the matrix and of the columns of the
matrix.
We do not claim that this procedure will generate every matrix (with co-rank c) with equal
probability. We must balance the uniformity of the distribution with execution time.
In step 2, the probability, p, that an entry will be set to 1 governs the sparseness of the
resulting matrix. The number of times step 3 is applied will also affect the sparseness, but to
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a lesser degree. Let us denote by δ the average number of nonzero entries per row. To attain
a target δ in the final matrix, one should take p to be slightly less than 2(δ − 1)/n. We chose
to execute step 3 2
√
m times. A larger number might result in a more random behavior.
For added efficiency, we performed step 2 as follows. For each i < n− c choose an integer
t distributed according to a Poisson distribution with expected value p(n − i). Then choose
t-many column numbers uniformly, at random, from {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n}. These are the entries
in row i that get set to 1.
9.3 Performance results for small random matrices
We investigate the performance of the algorithm on random, sparse matrices of varying
sizes and densities. This subsection presents results for random matrices of approximate sizes
50000× 50000 and 100000× 100000 called matrices 1 and 2. The matrices have approximately
1, 352, 000 and 2, 691, 233 non-zero entries respectively. Six matrices of each size were created.
Two matrices had 1 possible solution, two matrices had 32 possible solutions and two had
256 possible solutions. We ran experiments on four experimental platforms: lightning, light-
ningSMP, Grid5000 and Cyblue. Then we calculated the average running time for matrices 1
and 2. Figure 9.1. presents a chart of the runs using 32, 64 and 128 threads. Figures 9.2 and
9.3 are tables of same results for matrix 1 and 2 with more details. They divided into four
parts: I/O time, finding the row reduced echelon form time, finding the solution time and total
time. We did not apply the reorder algorithm on those matrices since they have small size.
We can see from Graph 2 that lightning and lightningSMP show the best performance. Our
guess is that the time difference can depend on the compiler. Both lightning and lightningSMP
use the Pathscale compiler, while Grid5000 and Cyblue use GCC compiler. Actually, we also
tried using the IBM compiler on Cyblue, however, the results were much worse.
By taking a look at the tables in Figure 9.2 and 9.3, we can see that increasing the number
of threads improves performance. The only exception is Cyblue, where a change from 64 to
128 gave almost no improvement at all. We ran several additional test on the supercomputer
and got similar results using 256 and 512 threads. The results are presented at section IV.D.
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Figure 9.1 Matrices 1 and 2.
We used a serial I/O function, which gives promising results for clusters. The Cyblue I/O
results are not as impressive. We tried to use our MPI I/O functions on Cyblue, but there was
very little improvement.
9.4 Performance results for large random matrices
This subsection presents results for random matrices of approximate sizes 500000×500000,
1000000× 1000000 and 5000000× 5000000 called matrices 3, 4 and 5. The matrices have ap-
proximately 2255000, 4407727 and 20006120 non-zero entries correspondingly. Three matrices
of each size were created: one with 1 possible solution, one with 32 possible solutions and one
with 256 possible solutions. As before we ran experiments on four experimental platforms:
lightning, lightningSMP, Grid5000 and Cyblue. Cyblue has 512MB of RAM per node and was
unable to construct the necessary data structure from the input files. The malloc function used
to allocate space for some of the rows returned with an error. This is why the chart displays
only the results for three of the machines.
To construct the chart in Figure 9.4, we took average running times from three matrices of
each size. We used 32, 64 and 128 threads. Our results show that the reordering algorithm has
70
32 64 128
lightning i/o read&write 0.970581 2.52989 1.71174
find RREF 413.7534 237.9963 170.0918
find solution 1.556988 2.052904 1.09743
Total: 416.281 242.5791 172.901
SMP i/o read&write 12.75897 9.840824 16.42543
find RREF 405.7852 263.6354 200.9423
find solution 8.175268 6.049766 5.507079
Total: 426.7194 279.526 222.8748
Grid5000 i/o read&write 2.323967 2.871135 4.135979
find RREF 565.7307 349.2106 262.2239
find solution 1.434815 1.565878 2.313098
Total: 569.4894 353.6476 268.673
Cyblue i/o read&write 69.21224 93.32425 68.18037
find RREF 1294.392 380.4477 378.9946
find solution 1.646677 14.17056 1.315804
Total: 1365.251 487.9425 448.4907
Figure 9.2 Matrix 1.
32 64 128
lightning i/o read&write 1.718309 6.01546 3.098082
find RREF 2933.446 2392.503 813.8769
find solution 2.746131 3.511424 2.889621
Total: 2937.911 2402.03 819.8646
SMP i/o read&write 2.757154 4.025831 51.95488
find RREF 2700.099 1542.307 1007.293
find solution 4.094313 3.30478 6.389119
Total: 2706.951 1549.638 1065.637
Grid5000 i/o read&write 3.56138 2.249488 3.99873
find RREF 3411.184 1894.51 1179.612
find solution 2.615994 2.345409 3.213319
Total: 3417.362 1899.105 1186.825
Cyblue i/o read&write 9.966552 131.6709 24.35653
find RREF 8815.717 2461.659 2461.778
find solution 4.041326 3.585266 65.55922
Total: 8829.725 2610.248 2551.694
Figure 9.3 Matrix 2.
no effect on the results. We believe this is due to the nature of the matrices that we tested.
Because the matrices were constructed at random they tended to be quite uniform from left
to right. In other words, reordering did not result in moving the less-sparse columns to the
right because there were no less-sparse columns to begin with. This stands in contrast to our
crypto matrices. On those matrices the algorithm was unable to finish without reordering. By
their nature the crypto matrices were not at all uniform.
From Figures 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7 we can see that lightning showed the best performance.
On the other machines, increasing the number of threads sometimes worsened the running
time. We believe that again, it is the nature of our test matrices that accounts for this
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Figure 9.4 Matrix 3, 4 and 5.
strange behavior. These matrices were exceedingly sparse, approximately 4 non-zeros per row.
The way our algorithm works, every row operation results in two MPI communication calls
(MPI Allgather and MPI Broadcast). With such sparse rows, most of the running time was
probably spent on communication. Since each platform uses different communicators, MPI
calls can take longer on one than on others. We plan further investigation into the underlying
causes of the performance differences and how to address them.
One thing we notice is that the I/O time is generally not significant. Typically we are
talking about a matter of seconds. However we see that the I/O time for Matrix 3 with 128
threads on lightningSMP was 130 sec. This is quite out of scale compared to all of the other
times. We conjecture that it is competition from other jobs running concurrently that slows
down the I/O. Since we were running several of our test matrices simultaneously, we may have
slowed ourselves down!
Finally, our study showed that the load balance function was never invoked. Again, we
attribute this to the uniform nature of the test matrices. This is in contrast to the cryptography
matrices, for which load balancing was essential.
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32 64 128
lightning i/o read&write 5.147227 4.299652 5.286664
find RREF 57.27072 44.7574 45.50847
find solution 15.75639 6.24439 8.876194
Total: 78.17434 55.30144 59.67133
SMP i/o read&write 3.217348 7.014034 129.7484
find RREF 242.7683 413.0013 602.9419
find solution 14.34756 40.9309 158.2444
Total: 260.3332 460.9462 890.9347
Grid5000 i/o read&write 3.297211 3.313362 7.468517
find RREF 617.5841 752.8128 905.719
find solution 7.923695 9.799342 9.191952
Total: 628.805 765.9255 922.3795
Figure 9.5 Matrix 3.
32 64 128
lightning i/o read&write 13.95488 7.029839 6.725169
find RREF 193.6696 129.2694 110.897
find solution 17.09733 13.76376 14.07818
Total: 224.7219 150.063 131.7004
SMP i/o read&write 12.98728 8.062209 7.279615
find RREF 552.0777 852.5517 1219.997
find solution 32.79713 66.81489 44.95949
Total: 597.8621 927.4288 1272.236
Grid5000 i/o read&write 8.176585 5.663151 5.262402
find RREF 1335.039 1527.113 1864.243
find solution 14.89192 16.4095 17.81099
Total: 1358.107 1549.186 1887.317
Figure 9.6 Matrix 4.
9.5 Performance results of experimental platforms
The four charts below show how each platform handled the task of solving matrices of
different sizes. We should mention that matrices 1 and 2 have higher density and solving those
matrices can take more time than solving larger matrices with smaller density. We decided to
divide matrices into two groups: small and large. The number of non-zero entries per row in
each category is almost the same. We wanted our runs to complete in reasonable time. This
is why the large matrices are less dense. The original cryptography matrices were more dense.
It sometimes took a couple of days to get them to the row reduced echelon form.
Figure 9.8 shows the results from the lightning cluster. We can see that the solution time for
each matrix decreases as the number of threads increases. That is, of course, what we expect
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32 64 128
lightning i/o read&write 42.4997 22.52167 60.40848
find RREF 5015.795 1862.399 1590.321
find solution 115.8615 54.69781 71.12552
Total: 5174.157 1939.619 1721.855
SMP i/o read&write 16.93715 108.8164 31.09077
find RREF 4733.855 4331.838 5343.936
find solution 65.44293 393.4341 282.5045
Total: 4816.235 4834.088 5657.531
Grid5000 i/o read&write 20.18628 78.78962 70.0332
find RREF 13223.1 11443.33 12224.47
find solution 187.3284 29.47163 122.4516
Total: 13430.62 11551.59 12416.96
Figure 9.7 Matrix 5.
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to happen. The chart does not show the running time for the other steps (I/O, assembling the
solutions) because the times were insignificant compared to the solving step.
Figure 9.9 show the results for lightningSMP. The machine shows good results for smaller
matrices. However, it is easy to see that for larger matrices the running time increases with the
number of threads. This is obviously undesirable. As we explained earlier, we attribute this to
the high proportion of time spent on communication as compared to calculation. The difference
in performance compared to lightning is presumably due to the communication strategy on
each machine.
Figure 9.10 shows the results from a supercomputer, Cyblue. The research shows that there
is significant improvement between 32 and 64 threads and between 128 and 256 threads, but
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Figure 9.10 Cyblue.
little difference between 64 and 128 or between 256 and 512 threads. We were unable to conduct
on Cyblue the same research we conducted on the other machines. Since our applications are
memory extensive, the machine was running out of memory. This supercomputer architecture
is not an appropriate platform for our purpose.
Figure 9.11 shows the results from the experimental platform Grid5000. The running time
results were mostly much worse than the results from lightning and lightninSMP clusters. It
is hard to explain the huge difference in running times for larger matrices. We know that
different compilers were used. Our algorithm involves many loops. The main loop is on the
pivot element and is done once for each unknown. For a matrix with 5, 000, 000 unknowns it is
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a long loop. We also have four if statements inside “eliminate the 1 on pivot place” routines. A
good optimization on loops and if statements can make a big difference. We plan to continue
running our experiments with different optimization options. The result presented in this
dissertation are for the runs with -O3 compiling option. The run without any optimizations
doubles the time.
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CHAPTER 10. Conclusions
We conduct the XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael. Our study shows that the XL
method works for one round Baby Rijndael. However, a four round Baby Rijndael can not
be cracked using XL or XSL methods when only one block of plaintext and corresponding
ciphertext are provided. The equations in the constructed systems are linearly dependent and
number of possible solutions for these systems is larger than the number of possible keys for a
brute-force attack. The XSL attack on four round Baby Rijndael with two blocks of plaintext
and cipher text seems more promising. Unfortunately, we were unable to solve the system,
since the matrix has grown rapidly. The authors of (4) also suggest that the attack might need
more than one block of plaintext available.
In order to solve a large system of linear equations over the field GF (2) that arises from
this cryptography project, a new parallel software package called SPSOLVEMOD2 was cre-
ated. This package is, to our knowledge, the first parallel implementation designed to find all
solutions of a large, sparse system of linear equations over the field GF (2). The package uses a
novel input/output format, performs load-balancing when necessary, and includes an optional
preprocessing step that reorders the columns of the matrix in an effort to reduce fill-in during
the row-reduction step.
In Chapter 9 we have discussed our first performance tests of the software. The linear
systems that we solved were large, very sparse and random. The uniform nature of the systems
had an unexpected impact on the solution time. This is in marked contrast to cryptography
systems we have solved.
We tested our software on several different computing platforms, with noticeably different
results. Gaussian elimination is a memory-intensive enterprise, and an abundance of processors
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will not compensate for a shortage of RAM. We have evidence that the communication design
of a particular platform has a significant impact on performance.
There is still much work to be done in this area. The nature of the system to be solved and
the communication overhead we experienced on very sparse systems should be investigated
further. However we believe that SPSOLVERMOD2 has the potential to be a useful tool
in several areas of discrete mathematics and cryptology. We hope that by improving the
software we might be able to investigate more complex systems of linear equations rising from
our Cryptography research. It should give more insight on whether the XSL attack can be
efficiently used in order to crack AES.
78
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publi-
cation 197, 2001.
[2] F. Cappello, E. Caron, M. Dayde, F. Desprez, Y. Jegou, P. Vicat-Blanc Primet, E. Jean-
not, S. Lanteri, J. Leduc, N. Melab, G. Mornet, B. Quetier and O. Richard, Grid’5000: A
Large Scale and Highly Reconfigurable Grid Experimental Testbed, SC’05: Proc. The 6th
IEEE/ACM International Workshop on Grid Computing CD, Seattle, Washington, USA:
IEEE/ACM (2005), pp. 99–106.
[3] N. Courtois, A. Klimov, J. Patarin and A. Shamir, Efficient Algorithms for solving
Overdefined System of Multivariate Polynomial Equations, Eurocrypt’2000, LNCS 1807,
Springer-Verlag, pp. 392–407.
[4] N. T. Courtois and J. Pieprzyk, Cryptanalysis of Block Cipher with Overdefined System
of Equations, Asiacrypt 2002, Volume 2501, Springer-Verlag, pp. 267–287.
[5] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, The Design of Rijndael, Springer-Verlag (2002).
[6] A. S. Fraenkel and Y.Yesha, Complexity of problems in games, graphs and algebraic equa-
tions, Discrete Applied Math, Volume 1, no. 1-2 (1979), pp. 15–30.
[7] E. Gabriel, G. E. Fagg, G. Bosilca, T. Angskun,J. J. Dongarra, J. M. Squyres, V. Sahay,
P. Kambadur, B. Barrett, A. Lumsdaine, R. H. Castain, D. J. Daniel, R. L. Graham and
T. S. Woodall, Open MPI: Goals, Concept, and Design of a Next Generation MPI Im-
plementation, Proceedings, 11th European PVM/MPI Users’ Group Meeting, Budapest,
Hungary (2004), pp. 97–104.
79
[8] A. George and J. W. H. Liu, The evolution of minimum degree ordering algorithm, SIAM
Review, vol. 31, no. 1 (1989), pp. 1–19.
[9] K. Hoffman and R. Kunze, Linear Algebra, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
(1971).
[10] http://bluegene.ece.iastate.edu, Cluster description (2010).
[11] http://crd.lbl.gov/ xiaoye/SuperLU/, Software description (2010).
[12] http://hpcgroup.public.iastate.edu/HPC/lightning/, Cluster description (2010).
[13] http://hpcgroup.public.iastate.edu/HPC/lightningsmp/, Cluster description (2010).
[14] http://www.netlib.org/scalapack/, Softare description (2010).
[15] A. Kipnis and A. Shamir, Cryptanalysis of the HFE Public Key Cryptosystem by Relin-
earization, Crypto99, LNCS 142,144, Springer-Verlag, pp.19–31.
[16] E. Kleiman and C. Bergman, Parallel Reduction of mod 2 Sparse Matrices: Design and
Performance Evaluation, submitted to Supercomputing 2010.
[17] E. Kleiman, The XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael, Master Thesis.
[18] B. A. LaMacchia and A. M. Odlyzko, Solving large sparse linear systems over finite fields,
Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO ’90, Springer, Lect Notes Comput. Sci., 537, pp.
109–133.
[19] J. W. H. Liu, Reordering sparse matrices for parallel elimination, Parallel Computing,
vol. 11 (1989), pp. 73–91.
[20] J. W. H. Liu and A. H. Sherman, Comparative analysis of the Cuthill-Mckee and the
reverse Cuthill-Mckee ordering algorithms for sparse matrices, SIAM, Numer. Anal. 13, 2
(1976), pp. 198–213.
80
[21] C. S. R. Marthy, K. N. Balasubramanya Murthy and Srinivas Aluru, New parallel algo-
rithms for direct solution of linear equations, John Wiley & Sons, INC. (2000).
[22] K. Nyberg, Differentially uniform mapping for cryptography, Advances in Cryptology,
Proc. Eurocrypt’93, LNCS 765, T.Helleseth, Ed., Springer-Verlag (1994), pp. 55–64.
[23] A. M. Odlyzko, Discrete logarithms in finite fields and their cryptographic significance,
T. Beth, N. Cot, I. Ingemarsson, eds., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 209, Springer-
Verlag (1985).
[24] Y. Saad, Iterative methods for sparse linear systems. Second Edition, SIAM (2003).
[25] D. R. Stinson, Cryptography: Theory and Practice. Second Edition, Chapman and Hal-
l/CRC (2002).
[26] D. H. Wiedemann, Solving sparse linear systems over finite fields, IEEE Trans. Informa-
tion Theory, IT-32 (1986), pp. 54–62.
